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Abstract: Family policy addresses some of the important challenges of post-industrial societies, 
and it presents an important dimension of the recent transformation of advanced welfare cap-
italism. This article analyses the development of family policy in the two East Asian latecomer 
countries of Japan and South Korea, where we witness significant policy expansion starting in 
the 1990s – with the latter displaying much bolder expansion and defamilisation. Explaining 
the difference in policy expansion, we show that the Korean electorate displays a much 
stronger pro-welfare orientation, which produced an environment for much fiercer party com-
petition on the grounds of social and family policy. 
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Across the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) world, family 
policies are on the rise. Whilst Nordic countries are typically considered the pioneers in this 
policy domain (Morel, Palier, and Palme 2012), we observe that latecomer countries of not 
only Europe (Lewis et al. 2008) but also East Asia has made considerable efforts to catch up 
with Northern European frontrunners. In this article, we analyze the development of family 
policy in the two East Asian latecomer countries of Japan and South Korea, where we witness 
significant policy expansion starting in the 1990s. The rise of family policy in these countries 
can be considered a departure from the established policy path, since the East Asian develop-
mental welfare state largely excluded families from public social welfare provision. Whilst 
both countries experienced a remarkable expansion of family policy, it is intriguing that the 
‘regional pioneer’ of Japan was eventually outpaced by Korea not only in terms of the speed 
and scope of policy expansion but also in terms of its progressive orientation. Korea expanded 
childcare provision rather aggressively, whereas Japan focused much more on ‘traditional’ 
cash benefits for families (An and Peng 2016).  
Analyzing the politics of family policy expansion in these two ‘most similar’ countries, 
we find that the Korean electorate displays a much stronger pro-welfare orientation (including 
childcare provision), which produced an environment for fiercer party competition on the 
grounds of social and family policy. Importantly, this provided the conservative Saenuri Party, 
the dominant party in Korea, with strong incentives to move into the political center. By con-
trast, Japanese parties were not exposed to the same electoral dynamics, and especially the 
dominant conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) could politically afford sticking with 
more traditionalist values. Thus, electoral incentives to campaign with childcare expansion 
remained somewhat limited though not absent, as compared to the Korean case. Instead, 
family cash benefits, which are more compatible with conservative value orientation, gained 
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greater electoral importance in Japan. In short, the speed and scope of family policy expan-
sion, in addition to specific policy choices in the two countries, was largely determined by the 
electorates’ receptivity towards family policy and by corresponding party-political strategies 
to exploit the political opportunity structure created by the electoral support for different 
family policies 
The article is structured as follows: To establish a baseline against which we assess 
recent family policy expansion, we show that the developmental state, corresponding with 
Confucian ideology, considered welfare provision for families a private matter and not a con-
cern of the public or the state; and accordingly, social welfare provision for families was very 
modest in Japan and Korea (The Developmental State and the Family section). Post-industri-
alization, however, successively undermined the Confucian family and the Confucian/devel-
opmental welfare equilibrium (Post-Industrialization and the Decline of Confucianism sec-
tion), and we witnessed a remarkable family policy expansion in the two countries transform-
ing the developmental welfare state (Family Policy and the Transformation of the Develop-
mental State section). Whilst post-industrialization provides an important socio-economic 
driver for the transformation of social welfare in the two countries, we highlight the crucial 
importance of political drivers – not only to account for the general trend of family policy 
expansion but especially for the greater speed and scope of reform in Korea. Also, this political 
analysis allows us to understand why policy-makers in Japan and Korea made different pro-
gram choices in policy expansion. After reviewing the literature on the political drivers of fam-
ily policy expansion in Japan and Korea (The Political Drivers of Family Policy Expansion sec-
tion), we examine the electoral dynamics in the two countries, and develop the argument of 
the critical importance of party competition and party-political agency (Electoral Competition 
and the Rise of Parties in Welfare Politics section). For the empirical analysis of the paper, we 
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make use of secondary data from the OECD and the International Social Survey Programme 
(ISSP) and, to substantiate the claim that attitudinal demands translated into policy expansion, 
we rely on 20 semi-structured interviews with Korean policy-makers and bureaucrats, 
whereas we refer to in-depth, secondary analyses of the Japanese case, which include rich 
qualitative material (including documents and interviews).   
 
I.  The Developmental State and the Family 
East Asian countries are latecomers in the institutionalization of welfare states. Social welfare 
provision developed in the context of late industrialization, and the East Asian developmental 
welfare state was built by conservative elites in the absence of competitive politics. Although 
Japan democratized in 1955, the LDP monopolized political power for most of the post-war 
period. For this reason, the Japanese state was typically described as ‘soft authoritarian’ (John-
son 1987), and it was not before 1993 that the LDP found itself on the opposition benches. By 
contrast, Korea’s authoritarianism was more obvious with the creation of a single-party re-
gime after the 1961 military coup. Elections were no more than an instrument of the dictator-
ship to formally legitimize its rule (Holliday 2000, 715; Johnson 1987, 143-44; White and 
Goodman 1998, 15).  
In the developmental state, we find a clear division of labor between politicians and 
bureaucrats. The former set broad policy goals, whereas the latter were in charge of policy 
planning, the development of new policy, and their implementation. Highly centralized bu-
reaucracies, sharing with politicians the key objectives of industrialization and economic de-
velopment, are considered key to the coordination of different policies for economic growth, 
and the developmental (welfare) state is typically associated with bureaucratic dominance in 
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policy-making (Goodman and Peng 1996, 196; Holliday 2000, 715). It was thought that eco-
nomic growth and the associated prosperity would legitimize authoritarian rule, which made 
the developmental state a strategy of “stability through growth” (Holliday 2000, 715; see also 
Kwon 1997, 497-80).  
At early stages of industrialization, however, social policy was considered incompatible 
with economic development, as growth strategies pursued light, labor-intensive manufactur-
ing, where pressure on labor costs left little room for welfare provision. When the economic 
success of light-industry-driven development created labor shortages and corresponding pres-
sure on wages, a shift in the developmental strategy towards higher-value-added heavy in-
dustry made economic development in the region and social policy compatible. The need for 
human capital investments for greater labor productivity and labor force stability provided 
the socio-economic underpinnings for higher expenditure on education and training in partic-
ular, but also on health and enterprise welfare (Deyo 1992). The developmental welfare state 
literature and the related productivist welfare regime approach (Holliday 2000; Holliday and 
Wilding 2003b, Kwon 1997, 2005) highlight that social policy was used instrumentally and 
strictly subordinated to the imperatives of economic growth and rapid industrialization in or-
der to catch up with the West.  
However, the developmental state was highly selective in its welfare efforts and in-
vestments, and it concentrated social welfare provision on the presumably productive parts 
of the population, especially skilled workers in large companies for productivist reasons, but 
also civil servants and the military in order to ensure the loyalty of these groups. Looking at 
the coverage of early social insurance schemes (health care and old-age security) we find that 
large parts of the population were excluded (Goodman and Peng 1996; Kwon 1997, White and 
Goodman 1998). Not only social protection for more vulnerable members of society but also 
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social care were not considered good investments but a burden on the economy (Holliday and 
Wilding 2003a). In other words, early social policies in the region focused on male industrial 
workers in strategic sectors, whereas labor market outsiders and especially women were 
largely excluded from welfare provision. Also, the notions of social citizenship and redistribu-
tion we know from the development of Western welfare states received very little political 
support. In fact, we find a “clear hostility to the European welfare state” (Holliday and Wilding 
2003a, 167), as it was believed among conservative elites in politics and bureaucracies that 
European-style social policy would undermine the traditional Confucian family. 
Critically, the developmentalist logic was reinforced by Confucian ethos, which shaped 
societies in the region. Confucianism ascribes great importance to the family and encourages 
rigid gender roles, with the men as the “natural” head of the family and its breadwinner and 
with women as the provider of care (Sung and Pascall 2014; see also Lewis 1992 on the male 
breadwinner model). Confucian values were compatible with the developmental welfare 
state, as the ideals of filial piety and family obligations provided a template for unpaid care 
work by women and social protection through the family (in particular, by the means of inter-
generational monetary transfers) (Jones 1993). These welfare arrangements allowed the de-
velopmental state to prioritize economic over social development. Developmentalism and 
Confucianism were complementary to each other, and created a stable equilibrium (cf. Hall 
and Soskice 2001 on the notion of institutional complementarities).  
Thus, in the familialistic and developmental welfare states of Japan and Korea, support 
for families and especially women’s labor market participation was minimal at best. During 
the long, unchallenged tenure of the conservative LDP government (1955-1993) family policy 
received very little attention. Limited childcare provision was geared towards children in low-
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income families, where the well-being of children was considered at risk because of the (nec-
essary) employment of both parents. Even when female employment participation started 
picking up in the 1980s, the child-welfare-centered approach to childcare persisted, because 
policy-makers viewed women only as temporary workforce to deal with labor market short-
ages. Thus, these limited services were not intended to promote female employment, and in 
practice did not facilitate much defamilization. Whilst Japan institutionalized maternity leave 
in the immediate post-war period, the scheme saw very moderate take-up, as women were 
conventionally expected to resign in the event of pregnancy in order to avoid being a burden 
to their employer and colleagues. As far as the cash dimension of family policy is concerned, 
Japan offered a modest, means-tested child allowance for very young children (An and Peng 
2016; Boling 2015).  
In Korea, similar to the period of LDP hegemony, we find the absence of meaningful 
public support for families until the late 1990s. Very limited public childcare was only available 
to low-income families, and the child-welfare-centered approach to childcare, observed dur-
ing the unchallenged LDP rule in Japan, could also be found in Korea. In accordance with little 
service provision, the cash and time dimensions were underdeveloped as well. Maternity 
leave was paid but short (maximum of two months), and only mothers were entitled to unpaid 
parental leave (Ministry of Labor 2008). In any case, similar to the Japanese situation, preg-
nant women were expected to resign from their jobs (Won and Pascall 2004).  
 
II.  Post-Industrialization and the Decline of Confucianism 
The family model of Confucianism and the developmental state have been successively un-
dermined by post-industrialization. As with Western countries, post-industrialization in East 
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Asia was accompanied by a significant increase in female employment participation (see Fig-
ure 1). Whilst Korean female employment participation is still below the OECD average, Japan 
has surpassed the OECD average. However, if one looks at full-time equivalent employment 
rates, one finds Korea (with 55.2 percent in 2013) outperforming the majority of Western 
countries (e.g. UK 52.2, Germany 52.3, France 51.8, Netherlands 42.7, Italy 38.6, OECD Aver-
age 50.4), pointing to a very low incidence of part-time employment in Korea (OECD.Stat 
2016). 
 
 [Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
At the same time, fertility has seen a dramatic decline in Japan and Korea, recording ultra-low 
fertility rates not only below the replacement rate but also tailing behind most of the OECD 
world (see Table 1). The low fertility indicates that Japanese and Korean families face serious 
obstacles to producing adequate future labor forces. We also observe an extraordinary in-
crease in divorce rates in the region (see Table 2), in addition to the ever falling number of 
multi-generation households (see Table 3). These trends indicate a growing risk of families 
failing to fulfil their role of welfare and care provider. They also suggest an increasing inci-
dence of lone parents and dual earners with young children, leading to rising work/family con-
flicts in the absence of kinship care or care services provided outside the family.    
 
[Insert Tables 1, 2 and 3 here] 
 
Based on these observations, we conclude that the Confucian family ideal has been eroding 
in Japan and Korea, and that families are now under considerable “stress.” The strong male 
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breadwinner bias in Confucian ideology (Sung and Pascall 2014) has fueled the rise of 
work/family conflicts in the face of increasing female employment. These developments have 
established the socio-economic underpinnings for a greater role of the state in family affairs, 
as with Western countries (Esping-Andersen 1999; Lewis 2009). 
 
III.  Family Policy and the Transformation of the Developmental State 
Japan is typically considered the region’s “pioneer” in social and family policy expansion, and 
it was  the early 1990s when family policy started to receive greater attention (see Boling 2015 
and An and Peng 2016 for Japanese family policy expansion). Towards the very end of LDP 
hegemony, in 1992, a new one-year parental leave scheme was introduced, which however 
remained at first unpaid and did not include a legal enforcement mechanism. Two years later, 
the first center-left government introduced a modest wage replacement of twenty-five per-
cent. In light of this weak institutionalization, it comes with little surprise that the widespread 
practice of women resigning from their jobs before childbirth continued, with almost one in 
four women quitting their job between 1995 and 1999.  
When the LDP was ousted from power for the first time in 1993, Japanese politics en-
tered into new territory. Although the non-LDP coalition government was short-lived, the LDP 
could only return to power in the form of coalition governments. In this new period of political 
instability, we observed major policy initiatives in the service domain to increase childcare 
provision. The Angel Plan (1994-1999) and the New Angel Plan (2000-2004) –the former was 
promoted by center-left forces and the latter under LDP leadership– set out an ambitious ex-
pansion of childcare services; and the enrolment rate for children under the age of three, for 
instance, was more than doubled from 10.1 in 1995 to 24 percent in 2010. However, succes-
sive governments fell short of meeting their childcare targets, as local governments struggled 
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to deliver government’s expectation; and waiting lists remained long. Even after the then 
prime minister Koizumi Junichiro (from the LDP) made a bold pledge in 2001 to eliminate wait-
ing lists for childcare, the situation remained difficult, forcing many parents to use low-quality 
yet expensive unlicensed childcare providers. Despite the persistence of problems, it is fair to 
conclude that the rise of the political left gave important impetus to service provision. 
By contrast, when the conservative LDP-Komeito coalition took office (1998-2009), the 
cash dimension experienced substantial improvements in 1999 and 2007. Importantly, the 
child allowance was extended to families with older children and higher incomes; and for 
younger children, the government increased the amount of the allowance. This child allow-
ance expansion points to greater familization, as it represents increased condition-free sup-
port for the family unit and can be deemed to provide a disincentive for mothers’ work. Unlike 
the services and cash dimensions, the development in the time dimension saw only modest 
improvement in benefit generosity during the LDP-Komeito coalition government.  
When the center-left returned to government led by the Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ) (2009-2012), it continued the child allowance expansion of its predecessor. The eligibility 
was significantly broadened to include all children under the age of fifteen regardless of family 
income. Nevertheless, the DPJ government fell short of implementing its election pledge of 
bolder improvements in benefit levels. Following a somewhat modest increase, the govern-
ment promised to meet the initial election pledge by 2011. The planned expansion, however, 
experienced a significant setback when the 2011 Tohuko earthquake put the most severe fi-
nancial constraints on the country. To fund disaster relief programs, the opposition forces 
achieved harsh cutbacks, including the reintroduction of the income ceiling. In care leave pol-
icy, the DPJ government was successful with a slight improvement in benefit generosity (now 
50 percent wage replacement rate) and with the introduction of two “daddy months.” Lastly, 
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to increase the number of daycare places for children, the DPJ government intended organi-
zational reforms, but this did not materialize because of considerable resistance in the bu-
reaucracy as well as among childcare professionals. 
Turning to Korea, we also find that family policy did not receive much attention before 
the political left gained weight in Korean politics (see An and Peng 2016 and Lee 2012 for 
Korean family policy expansion). It was only during the first center-left government of Kim 
Dae-Jung (1998-2003) when family policy was expanded in a meaningful manner. The most 
significant improvement occurred in the area of services, as the government intended to in-
crease both the demand and supply of childcare services. To boost the supply of childcare 
services, the government made it easier to open childcare centers by abolishing the previous 
government approval requirement. The deregulation of childcare provision led to near dou-
bling of the number of private nurseries during the tenure of the government (from 6,538 
centers in 1997 to 11,046 centers in 2002). With regard to demand-side intervention, the gov-
ernment introduced childcare allowances for low-income families. A series of reforms were 
implemented to improve the time dimension for parents with childcare responsibility. Mater-
nity and parental leave schemes were expanded in terms of duration and benefit; and the 
parental leave scheme, with a new flat-rate benefit, was also made available to fathers. 
Under the second center-left government of Roh Moo-Hyun (2003-2008), family policy 
gained prominence. Once again, the service dimension experienced the most substantial ad-
vancement. For the first time, the government subsidized childcare costs of middle-class fam-
ilies, with the explicit objectives of female employment promotion and investments in young 
children. Unlike its predecessor, which sought a market-driven expansion of childcare services, 
the Roh government was committed to public service expansion in order to improve the qual-
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ity of service. However, similar to the Japanese experience with the Angel Plan, the Roh gov-
ernment’s ambitious target of public daycare center expansion faced considerable opposition 
from local governments, and Korea remained heavily reliant on private providers. To support 
the care function in the family, the Roh government improved the benefit generosity of the 
parental leave scheme, and gave each parent an individual entitlement of twelve months. 
Here, it is noteworthy that the two center-left governments disregarded child allowances, but 
pursued childcare provision as a means of defamilization, and parental leave as a means of 
familization. Despite pulling into different directions in terms of labor market participation, 
both policies contribute to work/family reconciliation.  
The ten years of center-left rule in Korea marked a turn to investments in families, and 
family policy expansion did not stop when the conservative Saenuri Party returned to office in 
2008. In fact, the governments of Lee Myung-Bak (2008-2013) and Park Geun-Hye (2013-pre-
sent) accelerated the path departure initiated by the center-left. The conscious efforts of the 
Saenuri governments to outbid the advancements made by their predecessors suggest a re-
markable policy u-turn of the conservative party given that in the past the party upheld 
strongly traditional family and gender role values with its promotion of a “housewife-friendly 
society,” showing a very similar ideological platform to its Japanese counterpart.  
Improving the cash dimension, the Lee Myung-Bak government first introduced a 
homecare allowance for low-income families whose children (under the age of two) did not 
use externally provided childcare. Secondly, the flat-rate parental leave benefit was trans-
formed into an earnings-related scheme with wage replacement rate of 40 percent. Although 
the benefit ceiling remained modest (with 1,000,000 Won per month [approximately 575 
GBP]), this reform doubled the maximum benefit one could receive. Also, the service dimen-
sion saw considerable improvements during the Lee government by gradually expanding 
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childcare support to ever larger parts of the population. By 2012, childcare became free for all 
pre-school children except three- and four-year-olds regardless of household income. 
The current Park Geun-Hye government completed the expansion of free childcare ser-
vices, as childcare became also free for all children aged three and four. The new government 
furthermore introduced national curricula seeking to boost the quality of early education in 
childcare services. Whilst the complete shift to free universal childcare presents a “Nordic” 
policy change, Korea continued to rely heavily on private providers. At the very same time, 
the homecare allowance became universal for all preschool children, in addition to doubling 
the benefit amount for the under one-year-olds. Taken together, recent policy changes have 
doubled family policy expenditure between 2010 and 2013.   
While post-industrial pressures can explain the existence of a greater need for family 
policy intervention in Japan and Korea, it does not provide a sufficient explanation of why the 
expansion happened with greater speed and scope in Korea as compared to Japan. It is difficult 
to interpret that greater structural pressure existed in Korea. Also, a functionalist perspective 
cannot account for different patterns of family policy expansion. OECD social expenditure data 
confirms that Korea put a firm focus on childcare expansion. Early childhood education and 
care (ECEC) has grown out of virtually nothing to more than 1 percent of GDP, and it accounts 
for almost 90 percent of all Korean family policy expenditure. By contrast, in Japan, cash ben-
efits in the form of family/child allowances present about 50 percent of family policy expendi-
ture. In terms of percentage of GDP, the family allowances have seen an almost sevenfold 
increase since the 1990s. ECEC has grown much more modestly and account for only about 
one third of Japanese family policy expenditure (OECD.Stat 2016). To explain the differences 
in family policy expansion in the two countries, we highlight the importance of political agency 
by taking a view that structural pressure does not automatically translate into policy changes 
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without the involvement of political actors. Thus, we now turn to investigating the role of 
politics to explain the greater speed of reforms in Korea, in addition to the divergent pathways 
of reform in the face of similar, if not the same, structural pressures.    
 
IV.  The Political Drivers of Family Policy Expansion 
Early efforts of improving work/family reconciliation in Japan are commonly associated with 
the so-called “1.57 shock” of 1989, when the issue of low fertility (including its socio-economic 
implications) took a central spot on the political agenda. Following this critical event, Seeleib-
Kaiser and Tuivonnen, from an ideational viewpoint (cf. Beland and Cox 2011; Campbell 2002), 
observe “significant discursive shifts” (Seeleib-Kaiser and Toivonen 2011: 348), and argue that 
the rise of work/family policies was “largely engineered by key policy entrepreneurs” (ibid: 
349). In particular, they highlight the importance of well-known academic scholars, who put 
forward economic and human capital arguments for employment-oriented family policies 
(ibid.).  
Peng (2008; 2004) also draws attention to ideational changes in Japan, as well as in 
Korea. She underlines, however, civil society pressure (especially from women’s organiza-
tions) and bureaucrats’ concerns about the decline of fertility. Whilst the theme of civil society 
activism is well established in the East Asian welfare state literature (Kim 2008; Wong 2004), 
others have called into question the strength of women’s agency in family policy in the region. 
Schoppa, with reference to the Japanese case, argues that “organized women’s groups were 
poorly positioned” (2010, 48), and often organized around housewife issues, whereas feminist 
organizations were generally weak (see also Boling 2015, 123). Schoppa, who views the scope 
of work/family reconciliation policy expansion in Japan critically, concludes a “‘silent revolu-
tion’ in which women mostly accommodated the forced choice of the system and exited either 
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motherhood or career” (ibid, 423). Exit rather voice translated into the observed ultra-low 
fertility. Similarly, we find only modest influence of women’s agency in Korea. During the ten 
years of center-left governments, with the creation of the women’s policy unit and later on its 
promotion to the ministry of gender equality, feminist associations might have enjoyed 
greater influence (especially in agenda-setting) than their Japanese counterparts. However, it 
is doubtful that feminist agency was the driving force behind family policy expansions given 
the limited power resources of femocrats (Won 2007), among those many came from (femi-
nist) civil society organizations; and even women bureaucrats in the ministry conceded in in-
terviews that they lacked the power of their labor and welfare counterparts and depended on 
support from the president. Also, center-left lawmakers who were sympathetic towards the 
ministry’s agenda confirmed that the ministry lacked the power to drive the childcare agenda, 
but depended on support from the president and party to overcome considerable reserva-
tions if not opposition from other government ministries; and parental leave legislation stayed 
with the ministry of labor. Furthermore, their relationship with the government turned adver-
sarial when the conservative Lee Myung-Bak government attempted to abolish the ministry 
of gender equality, suggesting a further weakening of their policy influence. Yet, policy con-
tinued to expand, indicating that policy expansion did not depend on women agency in the 
ministry of gender equality. 
Schoppa’s argument of limited voice is also confirmed when looking at female repre-
sentation in parliament. Although we have seen increases in female representation (and in 
fact greater representation in Korea where we observed more family policy expansion) (see 
Figure 2), the number of female members of parliaments (MPs) in both countries throughout 
the 1990s and 2000s was significantly below the “critical mass” of 30 percent, which is typically 
considered to be necessary for female MPs to have a significant impact on policy (Childs and 
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Krook 2008; Dahlerup 1988). Looking at the Japanese case in greater detail, Gaunder (2012) 
notes that both the LDP and DPJ consciously increased the number of women politicians in 
response to the need to appeal to a broader set of voters, notably women. Newly elected 
female MPs, however, were not only too few in numbers, but also too junior to make much 
difference (see also Miura and Hamada 2014 on the weakness of female representation in 
Japan).  
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
Peng’s emphasis of the bureaucracy is important, since the developmental (welfare) state lit-
erature ascribes great significance and, in fact, considerable policy autonomy to bureaucrats. 
Schoppa (2010, 428f.) shares Peng’s observation that Japanese bureaucrats became increas-
ingly worried about fertility decline and related labor market problems, especially when labor 
market shortages became more severe in the late 1980s. Thus, civil servants showed concerns 
before their “political masters.” To address identified problems the ministry of labor, for in-
stance, proposed to improve childcare leave. The length of one year was thought to encourage 
women to return to the labor market. In the corresponding legislation of 1992, however, as 
discussed earlier, only unpaid leave with no meaningful enforcement mechanisms was intro-
duced. Employers mobilized heavily against the care leave legislation, as they had done before 
in the 1970s and 1980s (see also Lambert 2007). The LDP, concerned about the burden on 
employers, responded to business pressure, as they did in the past. And with women’s move-
ment lacking the will or capacity to press for more progressive legislation, negotiations were 
essentially between the ministry and employers, which ensured that the male breadwinner 
model was not challenged. 
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Hence, unlike the experience in some European countries (Fleckenstein and Lee 2014; 
Swenson 2002), businesses in Japan and actually in Korea as well (Lee 2012) present them-
selves as “antagonists” in work/family reconciliation policy and hold policy preferences that 
are very similar to their counterparts in liberal market economies (see Korpi 2006 for the no-
tion of antagonists). Apparently, businesses remained unconvinced of the presented business 
case; that is the economic and human capital reasoning behind employment-oriented family 
policy expansion. Providing an explanation for employer opposition, Estévez-Abe (2005, 2006) 
argues that the predominance of firm-specific skills, as found in Japan and Korea, increases 
the costs of women’s employment because of the greater risk of career interruption due to 
child rearing. This is a key factor as to why employers do not perceive the benefits of 
work/family reconciliation. Instead of promoting female employment, women are pushed to 
the margins of the labor market, minimizing the costs of women’s employment.  
Employers had important allies, not only amongst politicians but also in the bureau-
cracy. Peng (2008) notes ideational battles between technocrats in the finance ministries, who 
took a fiscally more conservative approach, and welfare bureaucrats, who supported family 
policy expansion. The battle lines can be observed in both Japan and Korea; in the case of the 
latter we also find the newly created ministry of gender equality supporting family policy ex-
pansion. Looking at the Japanese case in greater detail, Boling (2015) notes that welfare bu-
reaucrats continued to perceive childcare as a child welfare issue (typically geared towards 
children in troubled families) rather than a means of work/family reconciliation and social in-
vestment. However, divisions can be observed within the ministry. Bureaucrats from the “wel-
fare side” supported mothers taking parental leave, whereas the “labor side” took a more 
positive view on childcare in order to facilitate a quick return of mothers into the labor market. 
The prospect of more meaningful expansion was also undermined by bureaucrats’ reluctance 
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to mobilize significant resources for policy innovations, as the problem of long-waiting lists 
was largely considered a temporary problem in light of an anticipated decline in the number 
of children (see also Miura and Hamada 2014). Concluding her insightful analysis of the Japa-
nese case, Boling, intriguingly notes that welfare bureaucrats did not perceive the challenges 
of low fertility and the opening up of the political system as a window of opportunity for ex-
panding their policy portfolio, but rather as an unwelcome disruption of established commu-
nication channels with the LDP. One might thus want to conclude that Japanese bureaucratic 
policy-making was biased towards stability. 
On closer examination of the Korean case, we also find some lack of enthusiasm for 
employment-oriented family and social investment policies within the bureaucracy. As with 
Japan, welfare bureaucrats, being somewhat lukewarm about childcare expansion, saw child-
care primarily as an intervention to improve children’s welfare rather than a means to pro-
mote female employment or as an investment in children’s human capital. On parental leave, 
labor bureaucrats were not able to speak with one voice, as some opposed the use of the 
unemployment insurance fund to pay for leave benefits. The only marked difference in the 
Korean case was the earlier mentioned support from the newly created ministry of gender 
equality, which was keen on family policy expansion. Evidence from interviews indicates that 
the ministry pursued childcare expansion not only for ideological reasons but also to secure 
larger budgets in order to overcome their “powerlessness.” Whilst gender bureaucrats 
showed great enthusiasm, they lacked political capacity (Lee 2012). 
Rather than focusing on bureaucrats or civil society agency, Estévez-Abe and Kim 
(2014) propose an institutional model that suggests a greater “political opportunity structure” 
in Korea. They essentially argue that Korean presidents hold greater power than Japanese 
prime ministers because of the institutional structures of the political systems. Although it is 
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plausible that directly-elected Korean presidents, at least in electoral campaigns, are more 
sensitive to new social needs, it is less clear why Korean presidents, who cannot be re-elected, 
are in a better position to discipline parliament than Japanese prime ministers. Rather, one 
could argue, the absence of a chance for re-election reduces the costs of abandoning election 
pledges, and presidents might face an opposition majority in parliament. The latter happened 
to both center-left presidents in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and presidents of different 
political persuasion dropped or watered down social policy election pledges in the face of 
parliamentary or party opposition. Although we do not want to challenge that the president 
is of critical importance in Korean policy-making, the popular notion of “imperial president” 
needs to be put into perspective. Having said this, we acknowledge Korean presidents’ capac-
ity to re-organize the government, including the re-organization of government ministries; 
and in the case of the center-left Roh government, it is important to note that childcare policy 
was assigned to the ministry of gender equality, which was most enthusiastic about childcare 
expansion. Whilst this can be seen as making bureaucratic policy-making easier (given reser-
vations in other ministries), it also needs to be acknowledged that the re-transferal of child-
care policy to the ministry of welfare by the conservative Lee government did not stop child-
care expansion. In fact, it accelerated, as discussed earlier, under conservative leadership. 
Critically, though providing some important insights into policy-making, an institutional model 
struggles with accounting for the motivation of presidential leadership. The Lee government 
wanted to put its own “finger print” (namely, a child-welfare-centered approach as opposed 
to a feminist agenda of female employment promotion) to gain issue ownership of childcare 
expansion, which was initiated by the center-left. Also, one might want to suggest an incon-
sistency in the institutional argument, as Estévez-Abe and Kim contend that the Japanese elec-
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toral reform of 1994 did not translate into the expected changes. Whereas the previous elec-
toral system of multi-member districts and single non-transferable vote facilitated selective 
policy measures for electorally important groups (typically in the form of surrogate social pol-
icies) rather than providing comprehensive universal social welfare (Estévez-Abe 2008), the 
new system, with currently 295 members of the Lower House elected from single-member 
districts and 180 members from multi-member districts by a party-list system of proportional 
representation, ascribes much greater importance to voters in the political center (see also 
Boling 2015; Rosenbluth and Thies 2010). Estévez-Abe and Kim suggest that the limited impact 
of the electoral reform is related to unchanged patterns of prime minister recruitment be-
cause of short party leadership selection cycles. However, the need for regular party leader 
confirmation at party conferences is not an institutional feature that is unique to Japan but 
can be found in other countries (such as Germany) without creating a “hot seat” for heads of 
government or preventing comprehensive policy reform in the first place. In fact, the German 
case is interesting here, as the country experienced rather “social-democratic” family policy 
expansion under conservative leadership despite severe intra-party conflicts (Fleckenstein 
2011). 
Rather than pointing to the limited capacity of Japanese prime ministers, Ochai and 
Joshita’s (2014) analysis of Japanese prime ministers’ discourse from the late 1950s to 2012 
suggests that LDP prime ministers, who continued to dominate much of post-1993 Japan, 
lacked commitment to work/family reconciliation policy. Interestingly, Ochai and Joshita note 
that, from the mid-1990s (coinciding with the end of the old electoral system), the family had 
become an increasingly political issue. However, they also show that LDP prime ministers were 
slow to change. For instance, Hashimoto, who was prime minister from 1996 to 1998 and a 
very influential figure in the LDP throughout the 1990s, was very reluctant to revise the LDP’s 
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conservative family model in the face of socio-demographic changes. Also, Abe, during his first 
term in office (2006-7), essentially displayed the party’s ideological position of the 1980s, 
where the family was perceived as the main welfare provider and wives were assumed to be 
homemakers. This analysis of the persistence of conservatism in Japanese politics could be 
read in terms of an ideational barrier towards policy change. However, given that the starting 
points of the LDP and its Korean conservative counterpart were rather similar in terms of their 
stance on female employment and work/family reconciliation policy, the question arises as to 
why the LDP displayed a much more cautious policy modernization.  
 
V.  Electoral Competition and the Rise of Parties in Welfare Politics 
In both Korean and Japanese welfare politics, democratization and democratic consolidation, 
respectively, have been highlighted as an important driver of social welfare expansion (Hag-
gard and Kaufman 2008, Shinkawa 2007, Wong 2004). In 1987, Korea saw the end of military 
dictatorship with the first free presidential election; and in Japan, the LDP failed, for the first 
time, to form a government in 1993, which marked the end of one-party rule in Japanese 
politics. In the following year, the above mentioned electoral reform undermined the party’s 
ability to harvest electoral majorities out of special interests (such as farmers and small busi-
nesses). Instead, urban voters in particular (Pempel 2008) but also young people (Noble 2010) 
have been identified as new critical voting groups that parties need to compete for, pulling 
politics into the political center. Noble (2010) shows that the bloc of volatile, independent 
voters broke the 50 percent mark in 1995, thus making it imperative to attract these voters 
with policies. In Korea, the literature highlights the importance of regionalism in electoral pol-
itics in the aftermath of democratization. Rather than campaigning on policy platforms, party 
leaders relied on extraordinary electoral support from their party’s regional strongholds. Also, 
22 
 
party leaders were “sons” of their party’s home region (Kim 2000; Kim 2011). This regional 
party identification, however, has been declining steadily, and we observe the emergence of 
a new age-based cleavage, with younger voters displaying greater receptiveness to progres-
sive policies (Kang 2008; Kim, Choi, and Cho 2008). 
These developments challenge many taken-for-granted rules in East Asian politics. In 
tandem with democratization, Korea underwent a process of “welfare state deepening,” as 
Japan experienced some important welfare state expansion in the face of democratic consol-
idation (Peng and Wong 2010). Whilst the universalization of the fragmented social insurance 
system was a priority at first, the two countries also improved family policy provision to better 
support families generally, and especially (working) women with dependent children. We have 
shown that it was initially the political left which drove public support for families and 
work/family reconciliation. In the 1990s, with the Angel Plan, the Japanese left successfully 
spearheaded the expansion of childcare provision during its five years of government tenure 
(1993-8). Following the regional pioneer, Korea –with the ten years of left incumbency– saw 
the greatest rise of family policies helping with work/family reconciliation (An and Peng 2016). 
In the light of these early developments, one might be inclined to explain policy expansion in 
terms of the power resources model highlighting the importance of left forces in welfare state 
building; and more specifically the combination of political left and feminist agency in family 
policy expansion (cf. Korpi 1983; Huber and Stephens 2001). In fact, the greater expansion in 
Korea might be explained through the “additional” presence of feminist agency in the ministry 
of gender equality and in civil society, as discussed earlier. Having said this, contrary to parti-
san theory and perceived wisdom, we have seen that investments in families continued when 
the political right returned to government office. It thus appears that conservative parties re-
sponded to the agenda-setting and reforms of their left competitors.  
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But why did party competition in Korea become so much fiercer than in Japan, and 
resulted in much bolder policy expansion? In particular, it is rather striking that the conserva-
tive Saenuri Party in Korea modernized its family policy platform to a much greater extent 
than the LDP in Japan. As dominant parties in their countries, Saenuri and LDP are of pivotal 
importance for gestalt of party competition in the two countries, and its impact on welfare 
politics. To account for the difference in family policy expansion and party competition, we 
analyze attitudinal data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), which pro-
vides strong evidence for different political incentive structures in the two countries to pursue 
social and specifically family policies for electoral reasons. Whilst Estévez-Abe and Kim (2014), 
drawing on proxy questions for Confucianism (namely, “marriage is outdated,” “being a 
housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay” and “one of main goals in life has been to 
make my parents proud”), conclude that there are no attitudinal differences between Japan 
and Korea, we look more specifically at attitudes towards female employment and social and 
family policy preferences. Unlike what is portrayed by Estévez-Abe and Kim, we find consider-
able differences between Japan and Korea; and these differences, we argue, shaped electoral 
dynamics and party competition rather differently in the two countries.  
To start our general examination of attitudes towards social policy, we look first atti-
tudes towards the government’s role in reducing levels of inequality (see Table 4), and we find 
a more than 20 percentage point difference between Korea (75.1 percent) and Japan (54.1 
percent). In light of this first observation, it is not surprising that Koreans also display much 
greater support for providing a decent standard of living for the unemployed (see Table 5). 
Attitudes towards benefits for the unemployed might be described as the “litmus test” in wel-
fare state support, as unemployment protection faces particularly high barriers towards legit-
imization. Whilst you are rarely “blamed” for old-age, sickness, or disability, you might be held 
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accountable for unemployment because of an assumption of insufficient readiness for work 
as cause of unemployment (i.e. the debate over deserving vs. undeserving poor). These im-
portant two indicators point to much greater general welfare state support in Korea than in 
Japan.  
 
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 here] 
 
Looking more specifically at family policy and attitudes towards female employment, we find 
the persistence of conservatism in both countries, but to a much greater extent in Japan, 
where more than two thirds believe that women should stay at home in the presence of a 
child under school age (see Table 6). In Korea, less than half of the populations holds this 
strong view, and almost every other person supports part-time employment. Only a very small 
minority in both countries favors full-time employment. Interestingly, there is no significant 
gender difference in support of stay-at-home mothers in Japan (2.3 percent difference be-
tween men and women), but Korean women display more progressive views than their male 
counterparts (7.8 percent). As one would expect, we find the greatest support for female 
(part-time) employment amongst young women. Whilst the literature assumes an urban/rural 
divide to drive Japanese policies towards the center, we actually find, counter-intuitively, a 
weaker presence of progressive values in urban areas.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
In light of these attitudes towards female employment participation, it is hardly surprising that 
more than three quarters of Japanese people say that childcare for preschool children should 
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be primarily provided by family members (see Table 7). The Korean figure is almost 20 per-
centage points lower. In particular, a much greater role is ascribed to government agencies. It 
is noteworthy that, as far as family care is concerned, we do not observe any significant gender 
difference, neither in Japan nor in Korea. Surprisingly, we find more conservative views ex-
pressed by young Japanese women, as compared to all Japanese women and even to the over-
all population. And again, Japanese rural residents display more progressive attitudes than 
their urban counterparts. In Korea, young women hold the most progressive values. 
 
[Insert Table 7] 
 
Lastly, on the issue of who should pay for childcare, we find the majority of Japanese (60.3 
percent) ascribing this responsibility to families, whereas the majority of Korean (55.9 percent) 
calls for the government (see Table 8). Again, we do not observe any significant gender differ-
ences across the entire electorate. However, looking at the attitudes of young Korean women, 
we find the 26 to 35 (77.8 percent) and the 36 to 45 year-olds (66.2 percent) calling for gov-
ernment funding; this compares to about 50 percent of Japanese women in these age groups. 
And as before, urban Japan does not pull policies into the political center. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
This data show some considerable attitudinal differences between Japan and Korea. Gener-
ally, we find greater support for government responsibility in the Korean electorate. This ap-
plies to the state’s role in reducing inequality and providing a decent standard of living for the 
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unemployed, as well as the provision of childcare. These calls for the government are extraor-
dinary as the perceived wisdom does not expect Confucian societies like the Korean one to 
turn to the state, but to rely on the family and the community (cf. Jones 1993). Admittedly, 
with regard to female employment participation, we observe the persistence of some con-
servatism in Korea (especially, the limited support for full-time employment as typical else-
where), but nonetheless the presence of progressive values, especially if compared to Japan, 
is remarkable. It is noteworthy that, at the level of the general population, neither Korea nor 
Japan have seen the modern gender gap that has started to emerge in many Western coun-
tries with women leaning towards more progressive political views (cf. Inglehart and Norris 
2000; Abendschön and Steinmetz 2014). However, as expected from a party competition point 
of view in childcare policy, we find much greater support for public funding among young 
women (the main beneficiary of childcare support), suggesting the emergence of a more com-
plex gender/generation gap (cf. Norris 1999). Corresponding with the bolder expansion of 
childcare provision in Korea, we find much more progressive attitudes among young Korean 
women. In a nutshell, the ISSP data analysis shows much more fertile grounds for social policy 
and specifically childcare policy expansion in Korea.  
These differences in attitudes observed in Japan and Korea provide political parties in 
the two countries with rather different political incentive structures to campaign with social 
and family policies. Korean parties face much stronger bottom-up pressure for welfare state 
expansion and more progressive family policies. The Korean center-left party was a pioneer in 
responding to the pressure by making family policy a key election promise. Interview material 
provides strong evidence of a growing awareness in the center-left party that the reliance on 
regional votes would not be sufficient for electoral victory in the future. This applied in partic-
ular to the 2002 presidential election with Roh Moo-Hyun as a candidate who could not rely 
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on strong support from his home region, which was a conservative stronghold; as it was also 
feared that he might insufficiently mobilize regional votes from the party’s heartland, from 
which all previous center-left presidential candidates came. However, the party knew about 
its popularity among young voters, which generally considered Roh a progressive candidate. 
In this context, explicitly confirmed in interviews, the party and its candidate made a deliber-
ate decision to campaign with work/family reconciliation policy to mobilize these potential 
voters, which are generally associated with a lower electoral turn-out than older voters, upon 
which the conservative party relies on for victory. Not only was work/family reconciliation 
policy considered an area that was particularly relevant to young voters and that reinforced 
the progressive image of the candidate, but also it was argued that unemployment protection 
and old-age security had seen too much expansion during the Kim Dae-Jung government to 
campaign with “traditional” social policy expansion. Further to this, the conservatives, cau-
tiously though, started to recognize the electoral benefits of work/family reconciliation poli-
cies; and this was in turn perceived by the center-left as additional pressure to “outbid” 
Saenuri in this policy domain to retain issue ownership. In fact, one interviewee described 
childcare policy as the most important social policy issue in the 2002 presidential election. 
Thus, the decision to put work/family reconciliation center-stage was a strategic decision for 
voter mobilization.  
After losing two consecutive presidential elections, the Korean conservative party also 
came up with bold promises of family policy expansion, intending to attract young voters 
among whom the party had struggled to garner support. Whilst the 2002 presidential cam-
paign had already recognized the electoral value of work/family reconciliation policy (and the 
party gave up its previous “housewife-friendly” policy), interviews confirm that the 2002 pres-
idential defeat was critical in re-thinking more radically the party’s approach to work/family 
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reconciliation policy; and towards the 2007 presidential election, it was acknowledged that, 
as a result of the progress made during the two center-left governments, family policy gained 
considerable political salience, and it was understood that leaving young voters to the center-
left party would seriously undermine Saenuri’s chances for electoral victory. In the run-up to 
the 2007 election, Chun Jae-Hee, a female legislator with a long record of work/family recon-
ciliation advocacy, was appointed to one of the two deputy chiefs of its campaign team, 
demonstrating the conservative party’s determination to devise a comprehensive family pol-
icy platform which could be thought to appeal to young women voters in particular. In inter-
views, childcare policy was described as Lee Myung-Bak’s “flagship” social policy, and it was 
referred to the fact that childcare policy was one out of five key election promises. Thus, as 
with the center-left party (and responding to the party’s success), Saenuri perceived 
work/family reconciliation policy as a key issue in competition with the center-left; and this 
turn-around by the political right put pressure on the center-left party to make even bolder 
election promises, as confirmed in interviews. Thus, both main parties entered into fierce elec-
toral competition over family policy (see also Lee 2012). 
By contrast, social conservatism is, as the ISSP data analysis suggests, much more 
deeply rooted in Japanese society, which also seems to ascribe generally a much smaller role 
to the state in social affairs. The latter, in Miura and Hamada’s terms, could be viewed as a 
victory of neo-liberalism in Japan, where “party competition has evolved over neoliberal prin-
ciples” (2014, 10). This can be seen as preventing the electoral reform from pushing policies 
into the political center as widely expected. Whilst Miura and Hamada suggest that the LDP 
and the DPJ compete on rather similar neoliberal policies, it is conceded that we can observe 
some differences and contestation in the domain of family policy. The LDP, as discussed earlier 
with reference to Ochai and Joshita (2014), adheres to its traditional ideology that ascribes 
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the sole responsibility of children to the family (partly because of its religious support base), 
whereas the DPJ considers children a societal responsibility. The latter also adopted some el-
ements of the social investment perspective. In practice, however, Miura and Hamada con-
clude that “policy proposals were not so different as their ideologies might have suggested” 
(ibid, 23).  
Unfortunately, the ISSP data do not provide any question for child allowances, which 
have a great prominence in Japanese family policy expansion. This expansion is intriguing from 
the viewpoint of the demographic challenge Japan faces, as Boling notes that she “repeatedly 
heard that child allowances were too small to make a difference,” and that most interviewees 
told her that “they thought providing childcare was a more effective way to encourage people 
to have more children” (2015, 128). So, why was the expansion of child allowances pursued if 
it was considered not very effective in the tackling of Japan’s immense demographic chal-
lenge?  
Boling and also Estévez-Abe (2008) draw our attention to party political pressure from 
Komeito, the LDP’s common coalition partner in the post-1993 system. Komeito, whose pri-
mary supporters are urban, lower-middle-class voters, pushed for improved allowances for 
the benefit of its core constituencies, whereas the LDP and bureaucrats showed much oppo-
sition but had to give in for the survival of the coalition governments. Having said this, Estévez-
Abe highlights that, whilst the mainstream within the LDP with its great reliance on rural dis-
tricts opposed expanding the childcare allowance that was thought to benefit urban voters, 
LDP prime minister Koizumi recognized the importance of competitive urban districts that 
were considered vital for the LDP’s electoral fortunes; and he is thus argued to have used the 
pressure from Komeito to get his party reluctantly accept benefits for urban voters, and the 
LDP indeed increased its appeal to urban voters under Koizumi’s leadership. The DPJ jumped 
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onto the bandwagon with bold pledges to improve child allowances in order to highlight its 
support for families. Compared to childcare expansion, child allowances have the appeal that, 
in principle, they can be implemented much easier than pledges to eradicate waiting lists for 
childcare centers. Nonetheless, the DPJ in government faced some challenges here as well; 
especially after the 2011 Tohuko earthquake and tsunami, which understandably shifted the 
country’s attention to disaster relief, as mentioned earlier. Also, returning to the ISSP data 
analysis, the greater persistence of traditional values in Japanese society (even among young 
women) makes the increase of child allowances (rather than childcare expansion driving de-
familization) an electorally more sensible strategy if a party wants to show that it takes sup-
port for families seriously. Ambitious childcare expansion challenging dominant gender stere-
otypes might “upset” a too large number of voters.  
Although developments in Japan might not be as bold as developments in Korea, im-
provements in child allowances and the rising prominence of childcare with the Angel Plans 
are nonetheless significant, as they indicate a challenge to the hegemony of the LDP and bu-
reaucrats in social policy-making, and the rise of competitive politics where policies have 
gained increasing importance in electoral campaigns. Thus, even though the LDP remained 
the dominant party, the electoral reform undermined its previous unchallenged position and 
its ability to prescribe, together with government bureaucrats, policy developments. In earlier 
work, Estévez-Abe (2008, 234), specifically referring to parental leave legislation, also wrote 
that the political competition brought by the electoral reform made the LDP to accept reform 
policies that would have been non-starters in the 1955 political system.  
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Conclusions 
Both Korea and Japan have pursued some remarkable family policy reforms since the 1990s, 
challenging perceived wisdom of the developmental and Confucian literatures. Whilst Japan, 
at first, pioneered defamilization with the Angel Plans, attention later moved to familization 
measures with improving child allowances. Following the early lead of its large neighbor, Ko-
rea prioritized defamilization measures, which eventually resulted in universal free childcare 
provision under conservative leadership. Korean conservatives also promoted, though to a 
lesser extent, familization with the introduction of the homecare allowance for stay-at-home 
parents. Both countries also improved parental leave schemes. 
The far more ambitious family policy expansion in Korea (especially with regard to 
childcare policy), we ascribe to the greater extent of party competition as compared to Japan. 
We have shown the presence of much more progressive values in Korea, to which political 
parties of the left and the right (possibly somewhat opportunistically) responded. Here, the u-
turn of Korean conservatives is most important, which created a new political equilibrium for 
family policy. In addition to outbidding its center-left competitor with universal childcare pro-
vision, the Saenuri Party, in pursuit of a catch-all party strategy (cf. Kirchheimer 1966), offered 
the homecare allowance for stay-at-home mothers to its more traditional electorate. By con-
trast, the generally more traditionalist Japanese electorate did not provide the same pressure 
or political opportunity structures for comprehensive family policy expansion and defamiliza-
tion. Instead, party competition increasingly focused on the child allowance as a measure of 
familization in the face of the continued dominance of social conservatism. 
More recently, however, the Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe, who re-entered gov-
ernment office in 2012, has started to promote greater labor market participation of women, 
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and pledged to create 400,000 additional childcare places by 2017 (although it has been criti-
cized that the government’s proposals for achieving this have been somewhat vague). As part 
of his “Abenomics” agenda, female employment is considered a top priority for better eco-
nomic performance and growth (Boling 2015, 120; Miura and Hamada 2014, 14). These recent 
developments suggest that the gap in family policy between Korea and Japan might be closing 
with the LDP, mainly for economic reasons as it appears, presenting much more women-
friendly policies.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Source: OECD.Stat. 
 
 
Table 1: Fertility Rates in Japan and South Korea 
 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Japan 2.13 1.75 1.54 1.36 1.39 
Korea 4.53 2.83 1.59 1.47 1.23 
OECD 2.71 2.14 1.86 1.65 1.70 
Source: OECD.Stat. 
 
 
Table 2: Divorce Rates in Japan and South Korea  
 
 1971 1980 1990 2000 2005 
Japan 1.0 1.2 1.3 2.1 2.1 
Korea 0.3 0.6 1.1 2.5 2.6 
OECD 1.2 1.7 2.0 2.4 2.3 
Source: OECD.Stat. 
 
 
Table 3: Family Types in Japan and South Korea 
 
  1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Japan Nuclear Family 71.4 75.4 77.6 81.2 84.1 
 Extended Family 17.3 17.8 16.6 13.6 10.2 
Korea Nuclear Family 71.5 72.9 76.0 82.0 82.2 
 Extended Family 18.8 11.0 10.2 8.0 6.2 
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Figure 1: Female Employment Rates, 1981-2012
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Source: Statistics Japan, Statistics Korea. 
 
 
From: Inter-Parliamentary Union (2015) 
 
 
Table 4: “It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income be-
tween people with high incomes and those with low incomes.” 
 
 Strongly agree, 
or agree 
 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Strongly disagree, 
or disagree 
Japan 
 
54.4 28.9 16.7 
South Korea 
 
75.1 14.8 10.0 
Source: ISSP Social Inequality, 2009; own calculations.  
 
 
Table 5: “The government should provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed.” 
 
 Strongly agree, 
or agree 
 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Strongly disagree, 
or disagree 
Japan 
 
69.7 20.4 9.8 
South Korea 
 
81.0 12.4 6.6 
Source: ISSP Social Inequality, 2009; own calculations. 
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Table 6: “Do you think that women should work outside the home full-time, part-time or not 
at all when there is a child under school age?” 
 
 Work full-time Work part-time Stay at home 
Japan All 6.1 25.2 68.7 
Korea All 9.7 45 45.3 
Japan Men 4.2 25.7 70 
Japan Women 7.6 24.7 67.7 
Korea Men 11.2 39.1 49.7 
Korea Women 8.6 49.5 41.9 
Japan Women 26-35 6.3 38.1 55.6 
Japan Women  36-45 12.3 32.1 55.7 
Korea Women 26-35 8.7 55.1 36.2 
Korean Women 36-45 4.2 53.8 42.0 
Japan Urban 6.3 22.2 71.5 
Japan Rural 6.1 26.1 67.9 
Korea Urban 9.6 44.6 45.8 
Korea Rural 9.8 45.3 44.9 
Source: ISSP Gender and Family Roles, 2012; own calculations. 
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Table 7: “People have different views on childcare for children under school age. Who do you 
think should primarily provide childcare?” 
 
 Family 
Members 
Government 
Agencies 
Private Child-
care providers 
Others 
Japan All 76.5 11.1 11.4 1.0 
Korea All 57.1 27.8 11.5 3.7 
Japan Men 76.8 13.8 8.4 1.0 
Japan Women 76.3 8.9 13.9 0.9 
Korea Men 56.8 28.2 10.1 3.9 
Korea Women 57.4 26.6 12.6 3.4 
Japan Women 26-35 81.2 8.3 9.7 2.8 
Japan Women  36-45 79.6 11.1 13.3 0.0 
Korea Women 26-35 51.2 34.1 11.0 3.6 
Korea Women 36-45 47.9 29.2 14.6 8.3 
Japan Urban 80.8 9.1 9.7 0.3 
Japan Rural 74.4 12.0 12.3 1.3 
Korea Urban 53.8 30.3 11.6 4.3 
Korea Rural 60.0 25.6 11.4 3.1 
Source: ISSP Gender and Family Roles, 2012; own calculations. 
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Table 8: “Who do you think should primarily cover the costs of childcare for children under 
school age?” 
 
 Family Itself Government Employers 
Japan All 60.3 38.6 1.1 
Korea All 38.3 55.9 5.8 
Japan Men 58.9 39.3 1.8 
Japan Women 61.4 38.1 0.5 
Korea Men 38.7 54.0 7.3 
Korea Women 37.9 57.5 4.6 
Japan Women 26-35 47.9 50.7 1.4 
Japan Women  36-45 50.8 49.2 0 
Korea Women 26-35 19.7 77.8 2.8 
Korea Women 36-45 29.7 66.2 4.1 
Japan Urban 62.9 36.2 0.9 
Japan Rural 59.1 39.7 1.2 
Korea Urban 33.5 59.2 7.3 
Korea Rural 42.3 53.2 4.5 
Source: ISSP Gender and Family Roles, 2012; own calculations. 
 
 
 
